G-8 leaders: Recovery still facing obstacles

G-8 leaders begin talks at Camp David with the euro zone crisis among key discussion points.

G 8 leaders: Recovery still facing obstacles still Recovery Obstacles leaders facing

G 8 leaders: Recovery still facing obstacles still Recovery Obstacles leaders facing

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G 8 leaders: Recovery still facing obstacles still Recovery Obstacles leaders facing

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The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: accomplishments and challenges

align="left">Author: Masashi Nishihara, RIPS

align="left">Fifty-three heads of state and government leaders gathered in Seoul, South Korea, on 26–27 March 2012 for the second Nuclear Security Summit (NSS).

style="text-align: center;" align="left"> class="alignnone size-full wp-image-26453" title="Leaders and top officials from 53 countries, plus four international organisations, attended the two-day summit to discuss ways to bolster nuclear safety and counter nuclear terrorism. (Photo: AAP)" src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Nishihara-nuclear.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="296" />

align="left">Building on the first summit, which was held in 2010 in Washington, the leaders at the Seoul NSS committed to new, concrete steps toward containing nuclear terrorism. id="more-26450">

align="left">These commitments are critical given that scattered around the globe there are 1600 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 500 tonnes of plutonium, which is enough to produce more than 126,000 nuclear weapons.

align="left">The Seoul NSS produced many accomplishments. Thirty-two of the 53 participating countries announced either their progress toward nuclear security since the first NSS, or their plans to work toward nuclear security in the future. For example, since the summit in Washington two years ago, the US and Russia have converted 3000 nuclear bombs worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium. Also, Kazakhstan announced that with the help of Russia, the US, the UK and the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has stored all its spent nuclear fuel (enough to make several hundred nuclear weapons) in new, safe facilities.

align="left">The 53 governments agreed that by the end of 2013 the relevant nations would ‘announce voluntary specific actions intended to minimise the use of HEU’ by, for example, converting reactors from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium. Eight nations, including Ukraine, promised either to dispose of or return 400 kilograms of HEU to the US. All participating nations were also urged to ratify the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material by 2014.

align="left">In order to prevent loss or theft of nuclear materials, the Seoul communiqué suggested establishing an inventory to keep track of each country’s nuclear materials. But despite the actions taken and the pledges made by many of the participating countries in the second NSS, there remain many challenges.

align="left">First and foremost is whether the existing and future nuclear materials can really be controlled. The leaders at the Seoul NSS made political commitments to nuclear security, which the communiqué hailed as ‘substantive progress’. Bringing the issue of nuclear security to the attention of government leaders is a step in the right direction, because a high-level commitment will facilitate the execution of government decisions. But, at the same time, most of these commitments are voluntary rather than legally binding, which may affect the prospects of achieving nuclear security in the future.

align="left">A second challenge is the link between nuclear security and nuclear safety, an issue that has received much attention following the crisis at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Japan’s nuclear crisis has prompted the international community to consider developing precautions to ensure nuclear safety during a natural disaster. It has also revealed the potential vulnerability of power plants to nuclear terrorism, as terrorists need only damage a nuclear plant’s cooling systems to do great harm.

align="left">A third challenge is whether the Seoul NSS actually helped reduce nuclear tension in East Asia. So far, it has not. As expected, North Korea did not send a representative to Seoul. Instead, 10 days before the summit, Pyongyang announced its plans to launch a long-range missile, which it called a ‘satellite’, to celebrate the centenary of President Kim Il-sung’s birth.

align="left">A fourth challenge is China, India and Pakistan, which did send representatives to Seoul, but which are believed to be expanding their nuclear arsenals, clearly contradicting the summit’s intent. Given that the summit’s purpose is not disarmament but nuclear security, there were no attempts to persuade these countries to reduce their arsenals, nor to negotiate with countries such as India and Pakistan to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and abandon their nuclear weapons.

align="left">A final challenge is that the main weakness of the NSS is that its agreements are not legally binding. On its own, this may call into question the continuity of the summit, which risks being permanently discontinued if Mitt Romney is elected president of the US. In any case, the NSS should be continued even if under a different pretext. Looking forward to the next summit in 2014, to be held in the Netherlands, it is crucial that all states take their NSS commitments seriously and keep momentum on the enormous challenges that nuclear security presents.

align="left">Masashi Nishihara is President at the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo.

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IPO Report: Facebook launches biggest tech IPO on record

Social network giant pulls trigger on long-awaited IPO, pricing its shares at in a billion deal — the largest debut ever for a technology firm.

IPO Report: Facebook launches biggest tech IPO on record Tech Report record launches Facebook biggest

IPO Report: Facebook launches biggest tech IPO on record Tech Report record launches Facebook biggest

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China faces WTO again over rare earth metals

align="left">Author: Nabeel A. Mancheri, NIAS

align="left">On 13 March 2012, the US, the EU and Japan filed separate but coordinated complaints against China to the World Trade Organization.

align="left"> class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-26419" title="Chen Deming, Minister of Commerce of China, answers a question at a press conference for the Fifth Session of the 11th National Peoples Congress in Beijing, 7 March 2012. (Photo: AAP)" src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/20120307000407811160-layout.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="267" />

align="left">China’s export controls on rare earth metals and non-rare earth metals such as tungsten and molybdenum, which have many industrial uses, are at the heart of the complaint. id="more-26418">

align="left">China is the world’s largest exporter of rare earths, and has been regulating its supply since 2008. Since then it has introduced measures including high export taxes and, in the case of some products, has prohibited trade altogether. Earlier, in 2007, China withdrew the 16 per cent refund of value-added tax on exports of unimproved rare earths. The effect of this decision, combined with the export-tax regime, is that non-Chinese rare earth processors, such as producers of cerium polishing powder and rare earth magnets, pay 31 per cent more for rare earth raw materials than their Chinese counterparts.

align="left">A request for consultations with the Chinese government is the first step in the WTO dispute settlement process. If, as is likely, the parties to the dispute are unable to reach a resolution after 60 days of talks, the US, the EU and Japan will have the right to request that a WTO panel be established to hear the complaint. As it is very likely that the parties will not reach an agreement the process could lead to sanctions against China.

align="left">The complaints follow the WTO Appellate Body’s January ruling that by restricting the exports of nine other raw materials including zinc, coke and magnesium, Beijing was in violation of both WTO law and the country’s obligations under the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China. The Appellate Body concluded that there was no basis for general exceptions to apply to Paragraph 11.3 of the Accession Protocol, which requires China to eliminate all  taxes and charges applied to exports. Since the ruling, China has reportedly been increasing the supply of zinc, coke and magnesium, but not of rare earths.

align="left">In the present case, the complainants claim China is placing a range of export restraints on various rare earths and non-rare earths including export duties, export quotas, export licensing, and minimum export-price requirements. The US, the EU and Japan are also challenging aspects of the allocation and administration of export quotas, export licences and minimum export prices, and the alleged non-publication of certain measures. They further contend that the Chinese measures aim to satisfy domestic demand first, and control the international price of minerals, in violation of WTO law.

align="left">The measures appear to be inconsistent with various provisions of the GATT and the Accession Protocol, among other obligations. The most important provision on export restrictions is Article XI of the GATT, which prohibits quantitative restrictions. But export duties are not, in principle, prohibited under this article. Regarding quantitative restrictions, which are generally prohibited, the issue is whether China’s measures fit into a relevant GATT exception.

align="left">In both cases, China insists that its export restrictions fit within a legal exception to WTO rules, because its measures aim to protect the environment. In the January ruling, the WTO decided that price and quantity controls primarily targeting foreign entities were not a reasonable implementation of a conservation policy. China’s argument is unlikely to be more successful this time around. Article XX of the GATT, which lays out general exceptions to WTO law, allows trade restricting measures for the purpose of environmental conservation, but only if such measures apply in conjunction with restraints on domestic production or consumption. China has not placed restrictions on these activities domestically, and its argument is further weakened by the fact that regulating production — not trade — is the best option for the purposes of conservation and environmental protection.

align="left">China has already started negotiating with its counterparts. In particular, it has been advocating that more US, European and Japanese companies team up with local firms on rare-earth technology ventures. Environmentally friendly projects in areas like environmental management, recycling, and research and development of high-end applications have received considerable attention in recent times, but these proposals are unlikely to resolve the problems at the core of the dispute.

align="left">Despite the significance of China’s actions, most analysts argue that the shortage of rare earths will be a temporary phenomenon, because the rising prices for rare earth elements will encourage others to enter the market, leading to increased supply. The US, for example, has 13 per cent of the world’s known rare-earth reserves, and could re-enter the production and refining business. China’s efforts to exert price leverage are unintentionally driving a revival of global rare earths production and, over time, China will likely be just one of many global suppliers. China’s efforts to monopolise the sector are bound to backfire because such high-handed measures have prompted the rest of the world to formulate alternate strategies.

align="left">At the same time, businesses and policy makers around the world alike are concerned about the increasingly restrictive and unpredictable environment of international trade in industrial raw materials. Multilateral disciplines governing export restrictions are ambiguous, which creates uncertainty for industries that require these materials and raises the risk for investment in both mining and processing facilities worldwide.

align="left">Nabeel A. Mancheri is a Postdoctoral Associate at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.

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Indonesian investments and international treaty law

Authors: Simon Butt, Luke Nottage and Brett Williams, University of Sydney

Indonesia’s new mining regulation requiring divestment of majority foreign investments is unlikely to generate many formal investor-state arbitration (ISA) claims against Indonesia, based on existing bilateral or regional FTAs, or investment treaties.

class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-26368" title="New Zealand Prime Minister John Key gives a speech to the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry at a Business and Investment Seminar in Jakarta, Indonesia, 16 April 2012. (Photo: AAP)" src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/20120416000440214301-layout.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="268" />

Avoidance of arbitration is primarily motivated by immediate pragmatic considerations. id="more-26367">But considerable scope remains to use the international investment law framework further down the track and this may lead to complex adverse effects on cross-border investment, particularly in the rapidly evolving Asia Pacific region.

A conciliatory attitude toward the new regulation is still likely where the investor’s home state desperately lacks natural resources, such as Japan. This is one explanation for the lack of (direct) ISA claims by Japanese investors, despite Japan’s growing number of investment treaties around the world. These include the investment chapter contained within the 2006 Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement, with its heavy focus on enhancing Japan’s energy security.

But Indonesia’s new regulation could still lead to formal ISA claims, or — more likely — it could frame renegotiations with foreign investors and possibly their home states, which may well be covered by investment treaty protections. Indonesia has reportedly only been subject to three ISA proceedings under the 1965 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, to which Australia, Japan and the UK are also party. But a British mining company (Churchill) has recently announced it intends to bring ICSID proceedings against Indonesia for an earlier incident involving one of the world’s largest potential coal coking reserves.

Indonesia is also taking very seriously a highly politicised claim filed last year by a large UK-based investor in the financially troubled Bank Century. Rafat Ali Rizvi is alleging unfair treatment by the Indonesia authorities, including the judicial system, and expropriation after the Deposit Insurance Agency forced the bank into administration in 2008. On 4 April 2012 the tribunal (chaired by a former Solicitor-General of Australia) reportedly rejected Indonesia’s application, under ICSID Rule 41(5), for the claim to be dismissed on an expedited basis as manifestly without legal merit. A key issue — whether the claimant’s investment was properly ‘granted admission’ under the Indonesia–UK bilateral investment agreement — was found to be too complex to resolve under this preliminary procedure. Nonetheless, the arbitrators are likely to re-examine this jurisdictional objection at a later stage of proceedings.

Many investment treaties concluded by Indonesia, as well as several other ASEAN states, contain provisions requiring investments to have been ‘admitted’ in specified ways. For Australian investors potentially affected by mining investment divestment regulations and considering investment treaties with Indonesia, for example, the 1993 treaty between the two countries defines an ‘investment’ to be one ‘admitted by [Indonesia] in its territory in conformity with the laws, regulations and investment policies of [Indonesia] applicable from time to time’. It applies to investments ‘granted admission in accordance with the Law No. 1 of 1967 concerning Foreign Investment or with any law amending or replacing it’. (Indonesia’s current Foreign Investment Law is Law 25 of 2007.) The 2010 ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area agreement (AANZFTA) defines a ‘covered investment’ somewhat differently: one ‘admitted by the host party, subject to its relevant laws, regulations and policies’.

Such provisions may create difficulties for foreign investors considering treaty claims against Indonesia. Post-Soeharto democratisation and decentralisation have generated an extraordinarily complex set of laws and policies affecting the admission and operation of foreign investments. But if such preliminary hurdles can be overcome, Australian investors seeking compensation or a better negotiating position might argue that the new Indonesian regulations breach the following substantive protections under international treaty law.

First, one avenue may be through AANZFTA, which, for covered investments, provides ‘national treatment’, namely ‘treatment no less favourable than that [which the host state] accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors and their investments’. But footnote 33 makes this commitment subject to a Work Program, with national treatment obligations only coming into effect along with schedules of reservations permitted under Article 12 of the agreement. Australia’s 1993 investment treaty with Indonesia does not provide for national treatment, but it does include ‘most favoured nation’ provisions, allowing Australian investors to claim the benefit of protections extended by Indonesia to third countries.

Second, foreign investors might claim compensation for ‘expropriation’ or its equivalent arising from the host state’s measures. This option is provided in both the 1993 investment treaty and AANZFTA.

Third, the host state commits to extending ‘fair and equitable treatment’ to Australian investors under both the 1993 treaty and AANZFTA. Both treaties also extend other protections, which Indonesia’s new regulations may well violate, such as a requirement for the ‘transparency of laws’. Some provisions may impact on future measures as well, such as proposed restrictions on foreigners holding key management positions in human resources departments.

Lastly, while the 1993 treaty only allows Australian investors to commence ICSID arbitration, AANZFTA adds several options designed for ad hoc proceedings. The former usually provides for greater transparency in proceedings, but AANZFTA allows the host state, for example, to make public all awards and decisions rendered by a tribunal. This is important for host states, given the greater public interests involved in ISA compared to inter-firm commercial arbitration.

The international law regime does not and cannot solve all disputes, even with the increasingly sophisticated drafting of investment treaties. Widely accepted legal interpretations are still evolving and ISA disputes tend to become quite fact-intensive, generating costs and delays. But international law provides additional mutually agreed understandings aimed at balancing a host state’s interest in maintaining appropriate regulatory discretion while attracting foreign investment, with the reasonable predictability foreign investors expect — particularly in the resources sector. The ISA mechanism is important in giving traction to substantive rights. Recent developments in Indonesia therefore provide another reason to reconsider the eschewal of ISA in all of Australia’s future treaties, a change in direction announced by the Gillard Government’s Trade Policy Statement in April 2011.

Simon Butt is Senior Lecturer at the Sydney Law School and acting Director of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law at the University of Sydney (CAPLUS).

Luke Nottage is a Professor and Associate Dean at the Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, and founding co-director of the Australian Network for Japanese Law (ANJeL).

Brett Williams is Senior Lecturer at the Sydney Law School, and Public International Economic Law Program coordinator at the Sydney Centre for International Law.

A longer version of this article, including hyperlinks to further sources, is available here on the Japanese Law and the Asia-Pacific blog. The article draws on research for Luke Nottage’s project with Micah Burch and Brett Williams, ‘Fostering a Common Culture in Cross-Border Dispute Resolution: Australia, Japan and the Asia-Pacific’, supported by the Commonwealth through the Australia-Japan Foundation, which is part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

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Peter Brimelow: Another summer sag for stocks?

Does two down weeks mean stocks are starting another summer sag?

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Tony Judt Was Justified in His Scorn for Friedrich Hayek: Henry Farrell Is Not Aware of All Internet Traditions Department

Henry Farrell spells “Hitler” thus: “Hilter!!!!”. It is actually: “Hilter!!1!”. The “1″ is very important here…

Henry Farrell:

Judt and Hayek — Crooked Timber: A few months ago, Tyler Cowen argued that Tony Judt had been unfair to Hayek in his final book.

it doesn’t show Judt in such an overwhelmingly favorable light. He is cranky, unfair to his intellectual opponents, and he repeatedly misrepresents thinkers such as Hayek on some fairly simple points. …
One does not have to agree with Hayek’s Road to Serfdom to find this an unfair characterization:

Hayek is quite explicit on this count: if you begin with welfare policies of any sort — directing individuals, taxing for social ends, engineering the outcomes of market relationships — you will end up with Hitler.

But is that actually so unfair?… I re-read Hayek’s own introduction to the US edition…. [Hayek] very explicitly claims that the paternalist welfare state is creating the conditions under which (unless the policy is changed or reversed) totalitarianism will blossom, reducing the populace (as described in the bit of Tocqueville that Hayek quotes) into a “flock of timid and industrial animals, of which government is the shepherd,” which will surely sooner or later come under the control of “any group of ruffians.”

More tersely: Welfare Statism=Inevitable Long Term Moral Decline=Hilter! ! ! !

Hayek surely had his moments of brilliant insight, but this wasn’t one of them – for all his protestations of anti-conservatism it’s a fundamentally conservative, and rather idiotic claim. I don’t think that Judt was being unfair at all.

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Afghanistan: post-2014 strategy and the regional framework

align="left">Author: Dr. Simbal Khan, ISSI

align="left">As the 2014 security transition in Afghanistan approaches, it is imperative to adopt multiple strategies to pursue sustainable peace.

align="left"> class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-26312" title="Afghan President Hamid Karzai talks with journalists during a press conference in Kabul, Afghanistan, 3 May 2012. US President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai signed a long-term strategic partnership that outlines cooperation between the two countries after the 2014 withdrawal of NATO and allied forces, on 1 May 2012. (Photo: AAP)" src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/20120503000463148876-layout.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="259" />

align="left">A regional solution is often projected as a critical element in achieving this, and neighbouring countries are considered the key to stability in Afghanistan. id="more-26303">But this conviction in the importance of regional solutions is based on a series of misconceptions, and has prevented the development of any functional regional platform.

align="left">Many analysts and stakeholders assume that Afghanistan’s regional framework is the cause of the 30-year war in Afghanistan. The dominant views hold Afghanistan either as a giant crossroad linking various regional trade and resource nodes, or characterise Afghanistan’s security as a function of competing regional interests, such as the India–Pakistan rivalry. For some, the regional framework even holds the clues to future peace.

align="left">But these conceptualisations are reductionist and flawed, even if most regional countries have competing agendas on Afghanistan and have used it as an arena for proxy battles.

align="left">The real drivers of conflict in Afghanistan lie within Afghanistan itself. Contrary to widely held views, Afghanistan’s internal security dynamics are creating ripple effects that shape the security landscape in the bordering states. Other countries in the region, including Central Asian states and Iran, are affected by the war in Afghanistan in differing ways. The states bordering with Afghanistan are understandably more vulnerable than other regional states with geopolitical interests in Afghanistan — most notably Russia, Turkey and India. Among the states that do share a border, the vast deserts that straddle Iran and Turkmenistan’s border with Afghanistan relatively insulate them from the direct fallout from the war. But Pakistan, Tajikistan and to a lesser degree Uzbekistan, remain more vulnerable to the war’s spill over effects due to their trans-border multiethnic communities, difficult terrain and border politics. This variability also explains different approaches adopted by regional countries to the war in Afghanistan.

align="left">The model for future regional trade and transport offered by the Northern Distribution Network — which utilises Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as an alternative to Pakistan — is creating growing divergences among regional states. Russia’s response to growing US influence is to push for strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the rapid deployment force. Uzbekistan is opposed to the idea of the rapid deployment force because it remains wary of Russian influence and worried that such a force could become a tool for foreign intervention in its own internal affairs. Uzbekistan also remains wary of any regional mechanisms that may include states other than Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, as the events of the 2011 Istanbul Regional Conference suggest.

align="left">India is also likely to play a complex role in post-2014 Afghanistan. The core elements of US post-2014 Afghanistan Strategy revolve around retaining a credible counter-terrorist force and sustaining and supporting the fledgling Afghan state. The long-term strategic alliance between the US and India supports the projection of Indian economic and political influence in the South and Central Asian regions. The US military intervention in Afghanistan has been an opportunity for India to extend its political and economic influence in Afghanistan without committing any regular military troops. As the US strategy transitions to the next stage, both the US and India would seek a continued consolidation of Indian influence, preferably still without having to commit to any direct Indian military presence in Afghanistan.

align="left">Pakistan’s position on India’s role in Afghanistan is a complex one. In recent years Pakistani policy makers have come to accept India’s economic role in the region as a whole, particularly in Afghanistan. Pakistan is also not a natural competitor to Indian investment in resource extraction in Afghanistan, and it hopes to become a transit country for major energy pipelines that will fulfil India’s growing energy requirements.

align="left">The war in Afghanistan has devastated Pakistan’s macroeconomic stability and threatened its future prosperity and growth. Today there is a near unanimous view within Pakistan that there must be an end to the war in Afghanistan. The sea change in Pakistan’s earlier security-centric approach to Afghanistan is reflected in the belief that a peaceful and stable Afghanistan is critical to Pakistan’s own long-term prosperity, security and stability.

align="left">Pakistan believes that regional efforts will only meet with partial success until the roots of conflict within Afghanistan are addressed. Dialogue among the regional countries must support broad and sustained dialogue and negotiations among the Afghans themselves.

align="left">All parties to the conflict, including the Afghan government, opposition forces, civil society actors, the Taliban and other associated groups must be allowed to join the process of negotiation under a conflict-resolution framework. All parties must pledge to uphold the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, and leave the internal issues for Afghans to debate and decide.

align="left">Most of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan, are deeply troubled by the continuing war in Afghanistan. They are worried that the end game in Afghanistan is now heading toward the scaled-down goal of stability rather than peace. But stability in the absence of peace is likely to strengthen non-state actors and their ability to shape events in the Central and South Asian regions. Unless efforts toward long-term peace through negotiations and conflict resolution are strengthened, both Pakistan and Afghanistan will remain vulnerable to the corrosive economic and political impact of conflict beyond 2014.

align="left">Dr. Simbal Khan is Director of Afghanistan and Central Asia research at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

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Technology and culture to drive East Asia’s next digital revolution

Author: Andy Yee, Hong Kong

East Asia has long been at the forefront of the hardware digital revolution, boasting some of the world’s most highly connected societies.

class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-26229" title="Apple Store in Shinsaibashi, Osaka. (Photo: Flickr user jpellgen)" src="http://www.eastasiaforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Apple-Store.-Shinsaibashi-Osaka.-Photo-Flickr-user-jpellgen-400x283.jpg" alt="" width="400" height="283" />

And with a second digital revolution under way, the region’s diverse cultures are set to find new ways of combining technology and culture. id="more-26224">Previously unimaginable levels of information richness and new ways of engaging with it mean users are not only passive consumers who browse and download information from the internet, but also active creators who upload and share their own material with others.

The scale of production and distribution is staggering. There are now more than 800 exabytes of digital information in the world: every minute, there are 100,000 new tweets, 6 million Facebook views, 30 hours of video uploaded to YouTube, and 3000 photos added to Flickr.

East Asian countries are traditionally strong in hardware-driven innovations: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China are home to manufacturing powerhouses like Sony, Samsung and Lenovo. Collectively, these countries make close to 90 per cent of the world’s digital gadgets. The other side of the digital economy — the supply of digital content and services — attracts less attention in the region, but is already emerging as a formidable social and economic force, and will continue to grow as technology connects more and more people. The next digital revolution in East Asia will direct entrepreneurial energies toward creating new tools, content and forms of expression.

In 2002, Douglas McGray coined the term ‘Gross National Cool’ to explain how cultural exports such as Hello Kitty, Pokemon and anime fuelled Japan’s emergence as a cultural superpower during its ‘lost decade’. Former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi was one of the first to acknowledge the power of ‘Cool Japan’. Former prime minister Taro Aso went a step further and described himself as an otaku, a person who takes a keen interest in anime, video games and manga. And starting in 2008 Japan formally deployed its soft power by dispatching ‘cute ambassadors’ and appointing Doraemon as ‘anime ambassador’.

In her new book on otaku culture, cultural anthropologist Mizuko Ito explores how this participatory fan culture has flourished in the digital age because it enables fans to connect niche to niche and make an international cultural force of otherwise isolated cultural manifestations. Through fan fiction, anime music videos, fansubbing and various other remixes, fans have created rich international networks where they distribute their own content ahead of traditional media and producers.

Following the Asian financial crisis of 1998 South Korea also turned to Hallyu, or Korean wave, as an instrument of soft power. Korean pop culture first gained Asia-wide popularity thanks to the rise of satellite broadcasting. Today, Korean producers are using social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube to attract tech-savvy and culturally curious audiences in North America and Western Europe, with astounding success: in 2011, K-pop established itself as a global trend, with nearly 2.3 billion YouTube views.

Cultural power is subtle, but it may prove effective. Roh Moo-hyun, president of South Korea between 2003 and 2008, once remarked that Hallyu will someday unify the Korean Peninsula. While that may be a long-term prospect, a recent survey conducted by the Korea International Trade Association found that 80 per cent of respondents from Japan, China, Taiwan and Vietnam believed that Hallyu has positively influenced the purchase of South Korean products. In 2011, South Korean cultural exports, including films, music and TV shows, hit a record US.2 billion.

The increasingly global reach of South Korean culture has given rise to a variety of start-ups that develop creative digital tools to eliminate barriers to content distribution. These include the website viki.com, which relies on millions of volunteer users to translate acquired movies and TV dramas into multiple languages. Another website, flitto.com, aims to create a real-time translation tool for what South Korean movie stars say on social networks, and for globalising South Korean cartoons.

Taiwan is also beginning to turn its attention from hardware manufacturing to software system integration and content development. The government has set an ambitious goal of turning Taiwan into the hub of Chinese language-app creativity, with plans to produce some 20,000 app programs and train 1000 app-software specialists per year. Software innovation requires a very different mindset from hardware research because it aims to enrich people’s social experience or personal organisation, and this cannot be achieved without a deep understanding of people and culture.

This second digital revolution will be one to watch because it sits at the intersection of culture, diplomacy and technology. It will lead to new revenue streams for talented creators, and it will allow ideas and cultures to influence one another; the diversity of East Asian languages, cultures and social experiences underpins the richness of this revolution. Differences can be celebrated and more widely understood.

In the future, competition and innovation will be less about hardware than about people, cultures and social experiences — and about organising a value chain around them. Facilitating the next phase of the digital revolution — one that is based on innovation in social technologies and soft power — will be the challenge for the next generation of government and business leaders in East Asia.

Andy Yee is a policy analyst for Google in Asia Pacific. He has worked at the Political Section of the EU Delegation to China in Beijing and blogs at Global Voices Online and China Geeks.

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